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HENNINGSEN V. BLOOMFIELD MOTORS: LAST STOP
FOR THE DISCLAIMER
Freedom of contract has long been a keystone of the free enterprise
system.' That men of age and sound mind shall be free to enter into con-
tracts of their choosing, which will be recognized and enforced, is the founda-
tion of Anglo-American contract jurisprudence. Courts, adhering to the
principle that their function is to interpret and not to make contracts for
the parties, 2
 have been hesitant to find contracts void on public policy
grounds.
As commercial society has expanded, the single transaction has yielded
its importance to volume production, distribution, and sales. 3 The resulting
standardized contract gently and then disrespectfully disturbed the compar-
ative tranquillity of contract law. 1
 Form contracts, drawn by a business
firm, or a coalition of firms, to minimize or avoid juridical risks, have been
used in transactions involving the firm's products or connected services.
Standardized contracts are particularly popular with enterprises in strong
bargaining positions. If a prospective customer objects to its use, the large
business may well be in a position to ignore the transaction altogether and
to deal with another more ready to accept the terms dictated. Thus, the
weaker party often has no choice of contract terms and must accept dic-
tated conditions or forego the transaction. Courts, aware of the position of
such parties, have been sympathetic, but have remained hesitant to alter
the axiom that their function is merely to interpret contracts. Tribunals
have had to strain interpretations to relieve parties of unduly burdensome
or unjust provisions,° although in those states which have adopted the Uni-
form Commercial Code such provisions may be subject to deletion by ap-
plication of the unconscionable clause language of § 2-302.
From this problem has evolved a potent weapon for the rather bare
arsenal of the buyer,—the implied warranty of merchantability. This buyer-
protecting device entails an implied undertaking by the seller that all goods
sold are fit for the purposes to which such goods are ordinarily put.° The
warranty is imposed by operation of law independent of the express intent
I Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale L.J. 454 (1909); Williston, Freedom of Con-
tract, 6 Cornell L.Q. 365 (1921) ; Hamilton, Freedom of Contract, 3 Encyc. Soc. Sci.
450 (1937). This premise is reflected in the Uniform Commercial Code, See, 'UCC
§ 1-102.
2 Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U.S. 452, 462 (1894) ; Urian v. Scran-
ton Life Ins. Co., 310 Pa. 144, 165 Atl. 21 (1933).
a Pausnitz, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and Continen-
tal Law (1937), 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700 (1939); Llewellyn, What Price Contract—An
Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704 (1931); Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts,
27 Yale L.J. 34 (1917).
4 Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About 'Freedom of Contract, 43
Colum. L.Rev. 629, 631 (1943).
5 Kessler, op. cit. supra note 4, at 633.
6 Franklin Motor Car v. Ratliff, 207 Ala. 341, 92 So. 449 (1922); Swartz v. Ed-
wards Motor Car Co., 49 R.I. 18, 139 Atl. 466 (1927).
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of the contracting parties. Caveat emptor is dealt a forceful blow. The
jurisprudential basis of the warranty is that all sellers should be held to
assume the obligations which good faith sellers normally assume under like
circumstances.? Such theory was incorporated into the Uniform Sales Act
and the Uniform Commercial Code.°
Sellers, taking full advantage of their superior bargaining position, have
been quick to attempt to free themselves from this expanding burden of
warranty liability by disclaiming or expressly negating any implied warranty
which might exist. While the disclaimer is not inherently unfair where both
parties are in substantially equal bargaining positions, in the usual instance
of the standardized sales contract, there is no such equal or near-equal foot-
ing. The buyer is forced to disarm himself expressly of the shield the law
has given him. The Courts, aware of this inequality, have tended to construe
disclaimer clauses strictly against the seller° and by one means or another
have succeeded in vitiating their effect." Lip service has continued to be
paid to the parties' ability to contract away all liability, and though numer-
ous decisions have nullified the effects of disclaimer clauses, no permanent
change in judicial attitude has resulted in any denial that by proper words
all warranties might be excluded." The result has been a battle of wits
between the draftsmen and the Courts. 1-2
Many cases have been resolved in favor of the buyer on the ground
that the disclaimer was obtained deceptively. A disclaimer in fine print,"
or in an obscure place," which the buyer excusably did not read, has been
held not to negative liability." The Uniform Commercial Code has em-
bodied this approach stating that if the parties in good faith and without
coercion agree to exclude implied warranties, they may do so if the ex-
1' Warranties of Kind and Quality Under the Uniform Revised Sales Act, 57 Yale
L.J. 1389 (1948).
8 Uniform Sales Act § 15(2) ; UCC § 2-314(1).
9 Main v. El Dorado Dry Goods Co., 83 Ark. 15, 102 S.W. 681 (1907) ; Main v.
Dearing, 73 Ark. 470, 84 S.W. 640 (1905) ; Hall Furniture Co. v. Crane Manufacturing
Co., 169 N.C. 41, 85 S.E. 35 (1915) ; Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio
St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922) ; United Fig and Date Co, v. Falkenburg, 176 Wash. 122,
28 P.2d 287 (1934).
10 Hardy v. G.MA.C,, 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327 (1928) noted in 42 Harv.
L. Rev. 710 (1929), 27 Mich. L. Rev. 592 (1929) ; Hughes v. National Equipment Corp.,
216 Iowa 1000, 250 N.W. 154 (1933) ; Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790
(1927).
11 Note, 23 Minn. L.R. 784, 796 (1939) ; Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, 169
Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Mun. Ct. N.Y. 1939).
12 Supra note 7, at 1401.
13 Weedworth v. Rice Bros. Co., 110 Misc. 158, 179 N.Y. Supp. 722 (Sup. Ct. 1920),
aff'd, 193 App. Div. 971, 184 N.Y. Supp. 958 (1920).
14 Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, supra note 11; Angerosa v. White and
Co., 248 App. Div, 425, 290 N.Y. Supp. 204 (1936), aff'd, 275 N.Y. 524, 11 N.E.2d
325 (1937) ; Black v. B. B. Kirkland Seed Co., 158 S.C. 112, 155 S.E. 268 (1930):




elusion is in specific terms,—inconsistencies being resolved against the
Specifically, the Courts have inhibited the use of disclaimers in certain
types of transactions. Thus, in Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, a New
York court recognized that disclaimers in the retail sale of food should not
be tolerated because public health is involved, and, "it is against natural
justice and good morals to permit an individual or corporation to manufac-
ture food containing foreign substances and to escape the consequences of
his acts by a disclaimer.""
It is upon this scene that the case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield" ap-
pears. Mr. Henningsen purchased a new 1955 sedan from an authorized
Plymouth dealer. The purchase order (consisting of a one page printed
form) was executed by the buyer only. Near the bottom of the page and
continued on its reverse side appeared in fine print a disclaimer of all ex-
press and implied warranties, other than the customary ninety day warranty
on parts. This disclaimer was not brought to the attention of the purchaser.
About ten days after purchase, Mrs. Henningsen, while operating the
automobile at a moderate speed over a smooth highway, heard a loud noise
from the forward part of the car. The steering wheel spun in her hands. The
car veered sharply off the road and was totally demolished.
An action was brought by Mr. Henningsen and his wife against the
manufacturer and the dealer to recover for the injuries sustained by Mrs.
Henningsen. The complaint sounded in both tort and contract, on theories
of negligence and violation of express and implied warranties. Both the
manufacturer and dealer denied the existence of an implied warranty and
the ability of the wife to recover under a contract to which she was not a
party. The limitation of liability clause was also pleaded as an affirmative
defense.
As a result of pre-trial proceedings, there was a waiver of the express
warranty count. The trial court dismissed the negligence count but upheld
a jury verdict on implied warranty. On appeal the New Jersey Supreme
Court affirmed.
The major effect of the decision is in the area of disclaimer application
and limitation. Because of the waiver of the express warranty count, con-
tractual relief was based on an initial finding that an implied warranty of
merchantability existed despite contract provisions to the contrary. De-
fendant-Manufacturer claimed that lack of contractual privity neutralized
any possibility of an implied warranty since such can arise only as an in-
cident of a valid contract."
The court reviewed the economic and social considerations basic to
those decisions which have projected the manufacturer's liability to the ulti-
mate consumer even in the absence of any direct contractual relationship
16 UCC § 2-316.
17 169 Misc. 879, 880, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (1939).
18 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
19 Id. at 80.
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between them. 2° It adopted the view announced in Mazetti v. Armour and
Co.,21
 that concepts of social justice require that the liability of a food
processor or manufacturer to his immediate purchaser be extended to the
ultimate purchaser despite the lack of any contractual relationship between
them with the result that the manufacturer's implied warranty of merchant-
ability runs with the food into the hands of the ultimate purchaser. In effect
the court in Henningsen is extending this principle to manufacturers and
ultimate purchasers of new automobiles. 22
 In spite of this extension Hen-
ningsen, the purchaser, is faced with the task of establishing the invalidity
of the clause in the retail contract purporting to disclaim any warranties of
either the manufacturer or dealer except those expressly provided for in
such contract."
Two notable approaches have been used to limit the intended effects of
broad disclaimer clauses. One is illustrated in the decision, Meehan v.
Kaveny Bros. Oil Co., a case dealing with the purchase of a home oil stor-
age tank.24
 There the Court treated the warranty-disclaimer clause as being
divisible into distinct sections based on the use of conjunctive language. The
court held that the first section was a general warranty not limited to a
one-year period, while the second part of the clause referred solely to the
replacement by the seller of defective equipment returned within the year
period.
29
 Id. at Si.
21
 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
22
 Supra note 18, at 84.
23 The disclaimer and limitation of liability clause contained in the purchase con-
tract provided:
"It is expressly agreed that there are no warranties, express or implied, made by
either the dealer or the manufacturer on the motor vehicle, . furnished hereunder
except as follows:
The manufacturer warrants each new motor vehicle (including original equipment
placed thereon by the manufacturer, except tires), chassis or parts manufactured by it
to be free from defects in material or workmanship under normal use and service. Its
obligation under this warranty being limited to making good at its factory,*any part or
parts thereof which shall, within ninety (90) days after delivery of such vehicle to the
original purchaser or before such vehicle has been driven 4,000 miles, whichever event
shall first occur, be returned to it with transportation charges prepaid and which its
examination shall disclose to its satisfaction to have been thus defective; this warranty
being expressly in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied, and all other obliga-
tions or liabilities on its part, and it neither assumes nor authorizes any other person to
assume for it any other liability in connection with the sale of its vehicles. This war-
ranty shall not apply to any vehicle which shall have been repaired or altered outside
of an authorized service station in any way so as in the judgment of the manufacturer
to affect its stability and reliability, nor which has been subject to misuse, negligence
or accident."
24 27 N.J. Super. 547, 99 A.2d 841 (1953); the language construed by the court
was in the following clause:
"The seller warrants said oil heating equipment to be free from defects in material
and workmanship under normal use and service, and the seller agrees to make good at
its place of business any part or parts thereof . .. which shall, within one year after
installation be returned to the seller with transportation charges prepaid and which
upon examination discloses to the satisfaction of the seller to have been so defective. ..."
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A comparison of the language used in that warranty clause, with the
one contained in the instant automobile purchase contract shows them to be
essentially different, the language in the latter" not being susceptible to the
construction given by the court in the Meehan case.
Another approach used to invalidate disclaimer provisions in the retail
food and housing fields" has been grounded on the concepts of public policy
and inequality of the relative bargaining positions. Such theory was applied
a few years ago in Kuzmiak v. Brookchester Inc., 27 a New Jersey housing
case. It required only a finding of similarity in the automobile-purchase-
contract situation to enable the court in Henningsen to render a like de-
cision.
In the usual contract situation the premise is that the parties to a trans-
action not particularly effecting the public interest are bound by any liabil-
ity-limiting agreement." Public interest gives rise to public policy, an in-
herently vague term not confined to any fixed meaning since its very nature
connotes change." Indeed, a contract or particular provision thereof, valid
in one era, may be wholly opposed to the public interest of another day. 3°
A legislative determination that the housing field required statutory and
administrative regulations" provided the court in Kuzmiak supra, with an
initial finding of public interest. This factor when coupled with the judicial
realization of the unequal bargaining position of the tenant induced that
court to nullify the landlord disclaimer-of-liability clause.
The same method of approach was adopted in the present contract case.
The Court found a legislative reflection of public interest in the automotive
field as evidenced by the state statutes licensing operators and requiring
periodic inspection of automobiles." The adoption of the Sales Act 33 was
hailed as further evidence of a public interest in the rights and remedies of
purchasers of automobiles.
This initial finding of a public interest was buttressed by a sense of
25 Supra note 23.
26 E.g., Hart v. Klune, 320 Ill. App. 273, 50 N.E.2d 855 (1943); Welter v, Bowman
Dairy Co., 318 Ill. App. 305, 47 N.E.2d 739 (1943) ; Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co.,
189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382, (1920); Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (1936) ; Greenberg v. Lorenz, 12 Misc. 2d 883, 178
N.Y.S.2d 407 (App. Div. 1958) ; Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388,
175 N.E. 105 (1931) ; Jacob E. Decker and Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d
828 (1942).
27 33 N.J. Super. 575, 111 A.2d 425 (1955).
28 Globe Home Improvement Co. v. Perth Amboy, Inc., 116 N.J.L. 168, 182 A. 641,
(1936).
29 Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199 (1927).
3° Canopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958).
91 Board of Tenement House Supervision, N.J.S.A. § 55.9 at seq.
32 Title 39 covers the entire scope of state interest in the automotive field. A Divi-
sion of Motor Vehicles was established, N.J.S.A. § 39:3-4; regular inspection of motor
vehicles required, N.J.S.A. § 39:8-1 et seq.
N.J.S.A. §§ 46:30 et seq. It is to be noted that New Jersey has not adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code. § 2-316 of the Code distinctly allows this type of con-
tractual limitation of liability.
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equitable balance between buyer and seller in the automobile purchase
transaction. The New Jersey court recognized that the bargaining position
of the parties in relation to the actual terms of the contract is so dispropor-
tionate as to leave little chance that a retail purchaser could vary the terms
of the contract drafted by the manufacturer. Indeed, the automobile sales
area is marked by uniformity in the language of the purchase agreement. 34
Some legal commentators have urged this bargaining inequality as a sufficient
basis, apart from judicial notions of public policy, for invalidating an other-
wise effective contract. 35
A court approaching this case de novo might have reached the desired
result through a narrow factual determination, basing its holding on the
location of the disclaimer clause or on a forced construction resulting in the
division of the clause into two distinct sections. A decision based on the
policy grounds advanced in the instant case can serve as a guide post to fu-
ture adjudications in this field."
A note of caution to those who may feel that this decision sounds the
death-knell for disclaimer validity. A holding based fundamentally on a
theory of offering protection where such protection is needed; i.e., to the
disorganized and dependent consumer in the automobile purchase transac-
tion, should not be indiscriminately extended to include technically pro-
ficient industrial purchasers or others in relatively equal bargaining position
vis-à-vis the seller. Thus, in a wide area of our economy the doctrine of
freedom of contract would remain functionally and economically sound.
34 Automobile Facts and Figures 69 (Automobile Manufacturers Association 1958).
35 6 Williston, Contracts 	 1751C pp. 4968-9 (rev. ed. 1936). Llewellyn, What
Price Contract, 40 Yale L.J. 704 (1931).
36 Possibly the automotive industry could rebut this initial finding of inequitable
economic bargaining position between buyer and seller through the introduction of a
price differential between a new car with complete warranty coverage and one whose
purchase contract called for only a limited warranty agreement. This purchase contract
choice might predispose a future court deciding a similar case to insist that a purchaser
will not be allowed to base his recovery on a clause he specifically refused to include in
his contract.
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